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Abstract
Modern physical theories are deterministic in the sense that once we know the current state of the
world, we can, in principle, predict all the future states. This was true for classical (pre-quantum) theories,
this is true for modern quantum physics. On the other hand, we all know that we can make decision that
change the state of the world – even if, for most of us, a little bit. This intuitive idea of free will permeates
all our life, all our activities – and it seems to contradict the determinism of modern physics. It is therefore
desirable to incorporate the idea of free will into physical theories. In this paper, we show that in quantum
physics, free will leads to nonconservation of energy. This nonconservation is a microscopic purely quantum
eﬀect, but it needs to be taken into account in future free-will quantum theories.

Physics is mostly deterministic. Traditionally, in physics, the state of world changes with time in accordance with appropriate diﬀerential equations; see, e.g., [5]. For example:
• in Newton’s mechanics, we can use Newton’s equations;
• to describe the changes in the electromagnetic ﬁeld, we can use Maxwell’s equations;
• to describe the changes in the state ψ of a quantum system, we can use Schrödinger’s equations
i·~·

dψ
= Hψ,
dt

(1)

in which H is an operator describing the total energy of the system.
In all these situations, once we know the state of the world at some moment of time t0 , we can uniquely
determine its future state.
It is important to take free will into account when describing the physical world. In physics, the
future state of the world is pre-determined. This pre-determination contradicts our intuitive understanding
that we humans have free will, that often, we can make decisions, and the outcomes of these decisions are not
pre-determined: depending on what we decide, the state of the world will change.
Free will is not just an abstract philosophical viewpoint, it is a practical notion that guides our lives and
our behavior. It is therefore desirable to modify physics to avoid this disturbing contradiction between physics
and our everyday behavior; see, e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16] and references therein.
In classical (pre-quantum) physics, it is relatively easy to come up with equations that allow
free will. Let us start with the situation in classical (pre-quantum) physics. Let us start with simple
physical systems, such as point particles, whose state s(t) at any given moment of time t can be described
by describing the values of ﬁnitely many quantities s1 (t), . . . , sn (t). For example, in the original Newton’s
approximate description of celestial bodies as points, to describe the state of each body, it is suﬃcient to
describe the current values x1 , x2 , and x3 of its three spatial coordinates, three components v1 , v2 , and v3 of
the current velocity, and the body’s mass m. In electrodynamics of point particles, we need to add electric
change q to the list of these quantities. To describe a system of several interacting points, we need to describe
the quantities describing each of these points.
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Dynamical equations describe how each of these quantities change:
dsi
= fi (s1 , s2 , . . .).
dt
(j)

For example, in Newton’s celestial mechanics, such equations describe how the corresponding parameters xi ,
(j)
vi , and m(j) of diﬀerent bodies j = 1, 2, . . . change:
(j)

dxi
dt
(j)

dvi
dt

=G·

∑
k̸=j

(j)

= vi ;

dm(j)
= 0;
dt
(k)

√(

(j)

m(k) · (xi − xi )
)2 (
)2 (
)2 ,
(k)
(j)
(k)
(j)
(k)
(j)
x1 − x1
+ x2 − x2
+ x3 − x3

where G is the gravitation constant.
dsi
is no longer uniquely determined
dt
by the current state s(t). So, to determine the desired change, we also need to describe the values of some
other quantities f1 , . . ., which we can set arbitrarily because of our freedom of will:
If we take freedom of will into account, then the change in the state

dsi
= fi (s1 , s2 , . . . , f1 , . . .).
dt
There is no diﬀerential equations for describing how the quantities fk change, since we can change them at
will.
When the eﬀect of the new quantities is small, we get a small change in the original physical theory.
In quantum physics, the situation is drastically diﬀerent. In quantum physics, the situation is
diﬀerent. In quantum physics, the state of the world at any given moment of time t is described by a wave
function ψ(t), and the change in this state is described by Schrödinger’s equation (1). In this equation, the
change is determined by the Hamilton operator H that describes the total energy of the system.
dψ
So, if we want to allow non-determinism, if we want the ability to change the derivative
, we have to
dt
be able to change the Hamilton operator.
How this leads to nonconservation of energy. In quantum case, as we have concluded, freedom of
will means that we can modify the Hamilton operator, the operator that described the total energy of the
system. What does it mean that the Hamilton operator changes? It means for the some states, the energy
value changes. Thus, in eﬀect, in quantum physics, freedom of will means that, by exercising our will, we can
change the total energy of the system. In other words, in quantum physics, free will leads to non-conservation
of energy.
How big is expected energy nonconservation? As we have mentioned earlier, in classical (pre-quantum)
eﬀect freedom of will does not necessarily lead to energy nonconservation. Thus, energy nonconservation
caused by the freedom of will is a purely quantum eﬀect, that disappears in the classical limit, when the
Planck’s constant ~ tends to 0. So, this purely quantum eﬀect should be proportional to ~ and thus, it should
be reasonably small. This smallness explains why this eﬀect have not been observed: in our usual free-will
decisions, we control macro-size objects, objects for which the quantum-size microscopic changes in energy
are not easy to measure.
Conclusion. To make sure that physics is in better accordance with our intuition and our everyday experience, it is important to incorporate freedom of will into physical theories. Current physical theories are all
based on quantum mechanics; it is therefore necessary to incorporate freedom of will into quantum physics.
In this paper, we show that this incorporation leads to an unexpected observable eﬀect: nonconservation of
energy.
This nonconservation is a purely quantum eﬀect, it is microscopically small for macro-objects, but it needs
to be taken into account in future free-will quantum theories.
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